Introduction
Medieval Europe is a surprising place. Mostly fragmented into myriads of micro territories and city states, it saw the spread of two major institutional innovations that one would have expected to originate within the perimeter of a well-organized territorial state. The first of these was a cashless pan-European payment system, the bill of exchange. The second was the emergence of the firm, a permanent business partnership. Both phenomena have attracted scholarly attention for over a century, with extensive research being conducted by the Younger Historical School (prominently, Max Weber, 1889; Goldschmidt, 1891) .
Research by legal and economic historians has since created a large literature, to the effect that the details of the underlying historical processes are well explored and a rich set of stylized facts is available.
In the present paper we do not endeavour to add to the historical detail but rather attempt to establish a connection between the literatures on those two phenomena. We will argue that the principles that guided the first process -the emergence of bills of exchange as the dominant form of international payments in Europe -can also be found at the root of the second process -the emergence of business partnerships that went beyond the one-project, one-shot commenda contract. Greif (2004 Greif ( , 2006 has related the rise of the bill of exchange to the prevalence of the communal responsibility system in medieval Europe. Communal responsibility held all merchants of a town liable for each other in trade abroad. Similarly, it held all members of an extended family liable for each other vis-á-vis third parties. This archaic institution survived longer in the fragmented jurisdictions prevailing east of the Rhine and south of the Alps than in England and the nascent territorial states of Western Europe. We will argue in the following that communal responsibility is also at the root of explaining why the firm emerged first in the micro-territories of southern and Central Europe and not in the ascent territorial states.
Collective responsibility served to overcome agents' judgment proofness in the sense of Shavell (1986) , the shielding from claims due to insufficient assets. At the individual level, collective responsibility widened the pool of seizable assets to the extended family (which under the definition prevalent in pre-modern times included also a merchant's employees). At the city level, communal responsibility widened the liability pool to all of its merchants travelling abroad, overcoming judgment proofness of merchants in transactions outside their city's local jurisdiction. However, both forms of collective responsibility had the character of a public good, as they gave agents access to wider liability pools without imposing insurance premia for risky activities and without providing proper monitoring. We argue that the emergent business partnerships were particularly well-suited to this environment, as they furnished an alternative solution to the judgment proof problem -first at the family level, later even at the city level -that provided for proper mutual monitoring and insurance of the business partners.
Our review of the literature corroborates this view. Legal historians studying town statutes found that lawmakers spent considerable effort on creditor protection, attempting to minimize judgment proofness of the nascent firms. In a parallel development, town statutes and courts progressively reduced collective liability of the extended family, thus effectively substituting a merchant's family with the firm as his main source of liability insurance. Indeed, there is a striking similarity, first noted probably by Max Weber (1889) , between the concept of joint and several liability that became prevalent in business enterprises, and similar institutions known from family trusts since the Early Middle Ages.
We also find evidence on entity shielding, the protection of the firm from its stakeholders, whose historical significance has been emphasized by Hansmann et al. (2006) . While entity shielding figured prominently in partnership contracts, we find little evidence of it in town statutes. In short, regulatory efforts in the city states of the Middle Ages centred strongly on creditor shielding, while entity shielding emerged endogenously with the business partnership, requiring little regulatory activity.
The rest of this brief paper is structured as follows. The next section elaborates on collective responsibility as a prime mover of the use of cashless means of payments, drawing on Greif (2002 Greif ( , 2006 . We argue from our own earlier research (Boerner and Ritschl, 2002, 2006) that the basic parameters governing the setup discussed by Greif prevailed in much of Europe to the 17 th and even the 18 th century.
Section III reviews the debate on the origins of the firm -i.e., a long term business partnership. Scholars since Max Weber (1889) have noticed that business partnerships were rooted in contractual relationships within the family, and only gradually took on non-family members. In these family relationships, liability is the critical issue.
Section IV looks at the debates about the evolution of the firm contracts, and argues that the liability concept governing the emerging firm is analogous to the one prevalent in community responsibility among merchants at the city level, which governs trade and payment relations across territories in much of medieval and early modern Europe.
These similarities appear to go beyond a mere analogy. In the concluding Section V we argue that both derive from the same historical root, mutual responsibility for the actions of family members, and that their coexistence, as well as their common decline in the 18 th century, must have systematic reasons and cannot be coincidental.
Communal Responsibility and the Rise of Cashless Payments in Europe
Trade and payments in medieval Europe advanced quickly despite considerable obstacles that presented themselves through the fragmentation of territorial sovereignty. Even in the absence of the benefits of a common legal framework and of unified law enforcement, credit relations and forward contracting blossomed since the 12 th and 13 th century (on the origin of the bill of exchange, see Goldschmidt, 1891; Schaps, 1892; Schaube, 1898; De Roover, 1953 Planitz (1919) . This research argued that communal liability among merchants of a given city was the relevant enforcement mechanism: merchants from a given city risked being arrested and have their goods confiscated when travelling through a jurisdiction where a fellow merchant from their hometown was in arrears on his payments. Even claims from third places seem to have been enforced in this way. This included debt enforcement by robber barons acting as the agents of frustrated creditors, see Volckart (2004) . In practice, these rules implied that merchants in each city found themselves as members of a liability pool.
Greif (2002, 2004, 2006) The bill of exchange with its characteristic sequence of signaturesand hence, ranking of liability -was almost automatically in compliance with this system, so long as two of the three or more parties were residents of different jurisdictions. If protested, the bill would be presented to the drawee's court first, to the drawer's court after that and so forth, depending on the chain of endorsements (which however were mostly a development of the 16 th and 17 th century). Beginning with the second stage, communal responsibility kicked in, giving the second court additional leverage to enforce payment from the drawee before the drawer's own liability (if from a different city) had to be invoked.
With these additional safeguards, bills of exchange were an instrument that allowed enforceability to travel across jurisdictions. In the early modern period, it became customary to hold annual clearing fairs where only bills of exchange were traded. These fairs would take place in Geneva, Lyon, or Genoa, clearing the claims arising from all over Europe against each other. Any remaining net claims would be rolled over to the coming year or be settled with bills drawn on the major banking places of Europe.
Boerner and Ritschl (2002, 2006) document how the autumn fairs of Frankfurt in Germany assumed a similar role for the German speaking countries, beginning in the 15 th century. Soon it became standard to make out bills of exchange payable in Frankfurt at the upcoming autumn fair, or to back local bills of different maturity with bills drawn on Frankfurt.
The salient point here is that these payment enforcement systems flourished in the absence of territorial unification. One reason, as has been documented by Thomas (1977) for the Champagne fairs, was that the expanding territorial states did more damage than good to commercial credit. Merchants preferred the relative safety of city republics and of the many small territories that competed with each other for offering the most attractive trade routes. In contrast, the sovereigns of large territories would seldom resist the temptation to sacrifice the long term benefits of flourishing trade to the short-term fiscal gains from extortion or outright expropriation (as was the case in France in the 1300s, which contributed to the demise of the champagne fairs).
A second reason why this payments system worked so well is precisely the myriad of local liability pools it created. Whether they liked it or not, merchants in a given city were tied into a scheme that insured foreign claimants, and that diverted the incentive problems for individual merchants away from foreign to domestic default. Much as it fostered long distance trade and payments, this system generated incentive problems at home, which had to be solved at home.
Collective Liability Within the Family and the Rise of the Firm
Scholarly research since Max Weber has agreed that the origins of the firm cannot be sought in either Roman law or the commenda contract of the Middle Ages. 1 Roman law knew the societas, a contractual association. However, in contrast to the Italian compagnia that arose around the 12 th and became widespread during the 13 th century 2 , it lacked joint and several liability. Liability was not several, the Roman socii were liable only in proportion to their shares, pro rata parte. Liability was not joint either; the socii were liable only individually; a third party creditor would have to file claims against the member with whom he had actually contracted (Hacman, 1910) .
The medieval business partnership was a major step ahead. Both general and limited partnerships were commonly used, and joint and several liability was the norm in the medieval Italian compagnia contracts. 3 The same pattern can be documented for South German firm contracts from the 14 th century onwards (Lutz, 1976, pp. 17-19; Thomas, 2003, pp. 41f) , and later also in Baltic trade. (Cordes, 1998, pp.308-414) .
Legal historians have long been puzzled by the emergence of this entity, which appeared to have only weak or no roots in Roman law.
While collective responsibility was known at the city level, and was equally firmly rooted in the (extended) family, this institution appeared to be new. Max Weber (1889) dealt with this by arguing that the liability pool that characterized the firm emerged from earlier family trusts, which had their origins in Germanic tribal law.
Whatever the precise legal history of the institution, it is clear that most firms (even the giants emerging in Italy and, later, in Southern Germany) were essentially family firms that typically involved brothers, sons, cousins, and sons-in-law. Only gradually, non-family members from the same city were taken in. (Sapori, 1955a, pp. 803f.) . Blomquist (1971, pp. 159f.) documents this for Lucca for the end of the 13 th century. In Southern Germany, partnerships transcending the family can hardly be found before the 15 th century.
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Partnership contracts among family members would provide for contingencies like the transfer of capital from the father to sons entering the firm, or the transfer of dowries to sons-in-law as capital shares (thus keeping the capital in the firm). In the same contractual frame, capital was bequeathed to the heirs of a senior partner after his death. Max Weber (1889) argued that this specific transaction constitutes the historical root of the business partnership contract. Indeed, the continued operation of an estate, a workshop, or a shop by the heirs was traditionally covered 3 Typical setups are the Bonsignore contract from 1295 (Chiaudano, 1930, pp. 45-47) or a Peruzzi contract from 1324 (Sapori, 1934, p. 441 ; see also Hunt, 1994; Hunt and Murray, 1999 1910; Santarelli, 1964) .
Collective responsibility among the extended family thus reduced judgment proofness and provided liability insurance to the individual merchant. On the other hand, collective family responsibility induced potentially severe agency problems. In the absence of formal contracts, informal liability insurance through the family would seldom, if ever, impose actuarily fair premia, thus potentially distorting merchants' choices of risky projects. Without proper monitoring, insurance through the family would induce suboptimal levels of care (for the relevant mechanisms see Shavell, 1986) . Hence, while collective family responsibility was effective in reducing the exposure of creditors, it forced families into a liability pool with suboptimal characteristics.
The nascent firms provided alternative forms of liability insurance.
These provided for tight mutual monitoring of the partners, were typically long-lived, and soon evolved into a collective entity that was more tightly knit than the extended families they replaced.
Most business partnerships were formally limited to a fixed term.
Contracts often state durations of six to twelve years, and in rare cases no ending periods at all (Roon-Bassermann, 1912, p. 10; Lutz, 1976, pp. 210-213) . This stands in contrast to other merchant partnership contracts, such as the commenda, which were venture-based (see Pryor, 1977 , Boerner, 2007 . The time limit on a business enterprise contract did not imply that the partnership would be dissolved after its termination.
Instead, contracts were rewritten after the previous one had expired, often with minor changes to capital shares, the partners involved, etc. The contracts governing the Fugger company were regularly rewritten in sixyear intervals. What the time limit did imply was that a balance sheet would be drawn up at contract termination. In many cases, parties only left the compagnia in case of retirement or death. The exiting partners were replaced by new members. In this way, the compagnia could survive the life of its participants. Prominent examples of large and influential family firms include the company of the Bonsignori in Sienna during the 13 th (Roon-Bassermann, 1912, pp. 48-54) , the Peruzzi of Florence during the 14 th (Sapori, 1955b, pp. 665-9) , or the Fugger in Augsburg during the 16 th century (von Poelnitz, 1959) .
These contracts went a long way towards entity shielding in the sense of Hansmann et al. (2006) . Capital withdrawals before the expiry date were difficult or outright impossible. Partners had only access to capital in case of personal needs (Lutz, 1976, pp. 210, 370-82 Roon-Bassermann, 1912, pp. 11-3) . The context of this decision was earlier Sienese legislation that had relaxed joint liability in favour of pro rata liability. It has been argued that this development turned banking clients away from Siena (Sapori, 1955a, pp. 803-805) . 6 Thus, the court decision can be interpreted as an attempt to regain creditor confidence by strengthening liability again. For Germany, a law of 1464 under Emperor
Frederick III removed this uncertainty and differentiated between limited liability for passive investors and unlimited liability for active partners (Lutz, 1976, pp. 72-9) .
The salient feature of this evidence is the absence of detailed legislation regarding the firm, or even of firm bankruptcy laws. Santarelli With a firm contract at hand, the extended family could provide proof of existing business relationships within the family could to the authorities, as the legal presumption of a common household with the other partners in the family applied no longer. In the same vein, not being a partner to the business contract now became an effective shield against a relative's bankruptcy -while before, proof had to be brought that the commercial interests were separate, and that the relatives had not been living together for at least 10 years (Hacman, 1910) . Finally, the firm contract now made it possible to document conditions of limited liability: a partner's exposure could now legally be limited to the capital share (or even less if the local laws permitted).
Thus, the firm emerged from the perimeter of the family and its archaic system of unlimited mutual liability. In the process of doing so, it internalized the externalities of family-wide liability insurance, which it replaced with contractual risk sharing and close mutual monitoring among the active partners. It codified the distinction between active and passive shareholders and limited the exposure of the latter. Collective liability within the extended family was thus replaced with joint and several liability within the company. As such, the firm gradually loosened its ties to the extended family, just as it further weakened the extended family itself. The interplay between the rise of corporations and the decline of the extended family in medieval Europe has been emphasized by Greif (2005) . The shift from family responsibility to joint and several liability within the firm is but a special case of this wider phenomenon. These developments prepared the ground for the rise of a new entrepreneurial class that was autarkic from the communal liability structure of the family responsibility system.
The Firm and Communal Responsibility at the City Level
The nascent firm also impacted on a second liability pool, the communal responsibility of all merchants of a city in trade abroad. This institution provided liability insurance to a merchant's foreign clients. This had the potential to aggravate the judgment proof problem of the individual merchant, as it provided an incentive to engage excessively in risky activities, while transferring the risk from his clients abroad to his fellow merchants at home who were not parties to the contract. Arguably, the enterprise alleviated this problem, as it at least partly internalized this externality by forming liability pools that also provided internal monitoring.
One unresolved difficulty in this process was the emergence of firms that went beyond the city limits. While local firms were subject to local jurisdiction, conflicts could arise as soon as a firm's borders transcended the city limits. Indeed, Italian and German cities attempted to ban business partnerships of their citizens with foreigners. (Hacman, 1910, pp. 73f.; Lutz, 1976, pp.62-8) . Such policies could be enforced vis-à-vis smaller companies. In the case of more powerful companies, a stopgap was to grant citizenship to the foreign partner, even if this entailed double citizenship. 8 Clearly, city governments were worried about the risk of trade conflict arising over disputes within such international firms.
8 Partnerships of members of different cities are regularly documented for Southern Germany from the second half of the 16th century onwards (see the company contracts in Lutz, 1976) . A prominent exception was the Grosse Ravensburger Handelsgesellschaft, where we find members from three different cities already during the 15th century, see Schulte (1923) .
A prominent case from Nuremberg proved these worries to be correct (Lutz, 1976, pp. 141-53) Germany's near-independent city republics that had controlled trade across the Alps and with Eastern Europe since the High Middle Ages.
The increasing economic clout of the enterprise also led to intensified political agitation against their increasing monopoly power. (Blaich, 1967; Lutz, 1976, pp. 79-123 As a result, discussion of the monopoly act was further adjourned but the issue dragged on. Finally, in 1530 the emperor's court decided to protect its fiscal interest and save German big business from breakup. Still, with this decision the dependency of large enterprises on the emperor had been cemented, exposing them to fiscal predation by the Habsburgs and eventually contributing to their decline.
Concluding Remarks
The family-based firm flourished better in those parts of Europe where fragmented jurisdictions prevailed and where communal responsibility remained the norm on foreign trade and payments. We believe this is not coincidental. Communal responsibility at the level of the merchant association established a local liability pool that resembled the ancient family responsibility system (and also had its roots there, see Boerner and Ritschl, 2002) . Joint liability in the nascent firm was a similar concept, again with the same root, the liability within clans and extended families at the dawn of the Middle Ages. Both institutions originated from a tendency to channel this collective responsibility into civilized forms governed by due process, while retaining client protection against judgment proofness. Travelling merchants would be protected from random reprisals and outright robbery if a predictable system of sanctions was in place. Within the perimeter of the city, merchants would receive increased protection from sanctions against the extended family in case of insolvency and default. In both cases, we see a process at work in which mutual responsibility in the family is gradually limited and replaced with contractual institutions. In both cases, the institution opened itself gradually to non-family members. This had the effect of shifting the focus of protection against judgment proofness from the extended family to contractual organizations, of which the enterprise was better at internalizing the externalities of liability insurance. As the same time, it contributed to weakening the economic clout of the extended family .
Yet the connection between the two institutions was not just an evolutionary one. Communal responsibility at the city level gave merchants a strong incentive to form an association or guild, to control access and exit, and to monitor the behaviour of its members. Control is one reason why city authorities everywhere attempted to discourage business partnerships whose ownership transcended the city limits.
The externalities that arose with the communal responsibility system called for well defined risk sharing arrangements. The highly incomplete implicit contract that the old-style family responsibility system 
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